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Environmental aid has become a major component of development aid. We analyzed
the contingent characters of environmental aid of Japan and South Korea using the
definition of Williams, which regards aid policy as donor driven and autobiographical
of the donor agencies and societies from which they sprang. Both Japan and South
Korea consider environmental aid as an important tool of their diplomacy.
A combination of a moral obligation and domestic, international, political, and eco-
nomic interests underpin both countries’ environmental aid policy. Seen from the
stated policies and practices, both countries use accounts of their past as once-
developing countries trying to catch up in their aid narrative. In this manner, the
environmental aid of Japan and South Korea is autobiographic, reflecting their inter-
pretation of their own development history and position in global politics.
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Introduction
Environmental aid has become a major component of foreign aid as environ-
mental degradation and climate change have emerged as global concerns. Japan
contends it has committed itself to the protection of the global environment
since the 1990s, and environmental aid has been an important part of that
eﬀort. South Korea has recently become an emerging actor in the development
aid community. South Korea, said to be following in the footsteps of Japan in
designing and managing its aid (Kang & Park, 2011), has also started to market
its green diplomacy through programs such as the Global Green Growth
Institute (GGGI) and the East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP). Both
Japanese and South Korean aid have been criticized for being driven by their
economic interests rather than altruism or recipient needs and for focusing too
strongly on infrastructure projects (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Hirata, 2002;
Kalinowski & Cho, 2012; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development-Development Assistance Committee [OECD-DAC], 2008;
Watson, 2011).
A considerable amount of literature has been published on oﬃcial develop-
ment assistance (ODA) eﬀectiveness. In an attempt to better understand the
mechanism of aid and to improve its impact, a number of studies have analyzed
the reason why donors give aid and why it does not work (Dudley &
Montmarquette, 1976; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Lumsgaine, 1993; Easterly,
2006; Zimmerman, 2007). It is also argued that not only must aid be eﬀective,
but recipient countries ought also to have greater ownership and inﬂuence on aid
policy (Pearson, 1989; Cassen, 1994; Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007;
Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). As a consequence, donor countries and recipi-
ent countries alike agreed that aid should be more eﬀective by adhering to ﬁve
principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and
mutual accountability (OECD, 2008; OECD-DAC, 2011). Donor interest
versus altruism is another prominent discussion in aid policy debates
(Lundborg, 1998; Pedersen, 2001; Berthe´lemy, 2006).
Against this background, we aim to analyze and compare Japanese and South
Korean environmental aid to shed light on the inﬂuence that aid from both
countries can bring to the political dynamics of environmental aid. In our ana-
lysis, the starting point is the approach proposed by Williams (2002), which
regards aid policy as autobiographic of donor countries. In other words, aid
policy is donor driven and contingent upon the donor country’s self-image
rather than what recipient countries need. Using the autobiography approach
proposed by Williams, we examine various policies, government documents, and
the information obtained through interviews, and highlight ﬁve areas of
Japanese and South Korean environmental aid: the bureaucratic and institu-
tional imperatives, the internal procedures and processes, the stated policies, the
practices and particular attitudes that underlie them, and the broader impulses
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behind aid. In other words, this analysis seeks to understand Japanese and South
Korean environmental aid through a comparative analysis that draws on his-
toric, cultural, and economic indicators that were inﬂuential in determining the
direction of environmental aid rather than to evaluate them. Based on this ana-
lysis, it is argued that both Japan and South Korea have promoted experience-
based development in their environmental aid. This has set them apart from
Western donors and provides a diﬀerent kind of expert role, one based on its
own experience, with claims to near-universal applicability.
Aid as Autobiography
According to the OECD-DAC, which is an inﬂuential international forum for
selected OECD member states to discuss aid-related issues, ODA is the oﬃcial
and concessional “resource ﬂows to developing countries” from donor countries
(OECD-DAC, 2013a).1 When considering the allocation of aid, donors have to
decide (a) types of aid (grants, low interest, concessional loans for project, or
budget support, (b) the amount, (c) an agent to deliver the aid and to manage the
projects (national donor agencies or multilateral organizations such as the World
Bank or the United Nations), (d) recipient countries, and (e) public or private
institutions within recipient countries to receive aid (Hicks, Parks, Roberts, &
Tierney, 2008). One of the best-known targets in aid is a proposal to make ODA
contributions equivalent to 0.7% of donor countries’ gross national income
(ODA/GNI target; OECD, 2013a). In addition, since its creation in 1961, the
DAC has recommended to untie aid because tying aid, which is to oﬀer aid on the
condition that it be used to procure goods or services from a speciﬁc country or
region, contributes to lowering the aid eﬀectiveness (OECD-DAC, 2013c). The
DAC has adopted ﬁve criteria (relevance, eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, impact, and
sustainability) in evaluating aid since the 1990s (OECD, 1991).
These proposals for aid eﬀectiveness explicitly or implicitly express normative
concerns; they seek to say something about what ought to be, and be done.
From a policy perspective, these proposals are of course highly relevant; how-
ever, in this article, we attempt to explore how aid policies in the case of
Japanese and South Korean environmental aid are guided by reﬂections of
trends in the countries’ own policy environment. As previously mentioned,
both countries have been criticized for pursuing economic and political self-
interest through their aid. The question we raise here, however, is whether pol-
itical and economic self-interest necessarily stands in opposition to, for example,
humanitarian objectives. Williams (2002) asks whether it is possible to claim that
the work of aid agencies may not be grounded in any well-established claim
about the eﬀectiveness of their work at all but rather about the desirability of
particular policies or aid projects. A proposal that aid often is autobiographical
of the donor rather than a well-thought assessment of the needs of the recipient
opens opportunities that may provide new insights into aid policy formulation
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and practices. Whether humanitarian impulse, security, and political or eco-
nomic concerns actually guide aid is no longer in opposition to each other but
rather a reﬂection of the donor’s multiple concerns. An autobiographical
approach moves away from a normative analysis of what aid ought to do.
It also moves the focus of aid eﬀectiveness from deﬁciencies of recipients, such
as poor governance and corruption, to an analysis of the aid donor, and how
particular values and institutional imperatives are embedded in the donor’s aid
policy. Our approach to Japanese and South Korean aid thus seeks to identify
the historically, culturally, and economically contingent character of the envir-
onmental aid of both countries.
According to Williams (2002), the idea that aid is donor driven and autobio-
graphical of a donor can be explored in ﬁve areas: ﬁrst, “in terms of the bur-
eaucratic and institutional imperatives facing aid agencies,” in other words, what
are the bureaucratic and institutional imperatives or “hard humanitarian inter-
ests” that aid agencies face? (p. 159). These hard interests include the ability to
earn money, spend money, and avoid criticism that may impede their ability to
raise further funds. The second question asks about “the internal procedures and
processes of the agencies (Williams 2002, p. 159).” Aid agencies tend to adopt
similar programming systems as those preferred by those in control of fund
allocation. Williams highlights the proliferation of an evaluation and auditing
culture that may aﬀect the aid agency’s operations. Evaluation and auditing
procedures may operate as control systems that deﬁne and conﬁne the aid
agency’s operational processes. Third, the idea can be explored “in terms of
the stated policies of the agencies”: The agency’s policies may not be a learning
from experience approach, but driven by changes in broader political concerns
in donor countries (Williams, 2002, p. 159). Fourth, the approach inquires about
the “terms of the practices of aid agencies”; Williams identiﬁes the expert culture
of aid agencies and professionals that dictates that they know best, or at least
they know best how to identify what the recipient needs (2002, p. 159). This
expert knowledge justiﬁes the existence of the aid agency and programs. Finally,
Williams proposes as a ﬁfth area of inquiry, “the broader impulses in donor
countries that drive aid and humanitarian activity” (2002, p. 159). This includes
a more fundamental exploration regarding what drives our concern for helping
the poor. In our analysis, we refer to these ﬁve areas as follows: the bureaucratic
and institutional imperatives, the internal procedures and processes, the stated
policies, the practices and particular attitude that underlie them, and the broader
impulse behind aid.
With this framework in mind, our assumption is that Japanese and South
Korean aid is contingent upon changing balances of economic interest, foreign
relations, and humanitarian concerns. These may be applied simultaneously
with certain biases, they may change over time, and they may change according
to recipient countries. Meanwhile, we acknowledge limitations to applying the
Williams’s (2002) approach. For instance, autobiographical analysis does little
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to understand the outcomes of environmental aid policies or how these policies
are negotiated and renegotiated in speciﬁc projects, where a variety of actors
such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and recipient country govern-
ments may inﬂuence actual implementation. Although we accept these limita-
tions, an autobiographical approach is useful to delve deeper into the processes
of environmental aid policy formulation as inﬂuenced by the donor’s stories
about themselves.
Background on Japanese Aid
In 2012, Japan was the ﬁfth largest aid donor, providing 10.49 billion USD in
ODA (OECD, 2013b). Japan is so far the only major aid donor not located in
Western Europe or North America. In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan was the ﬁrst
or second largest aid donor among DAC donor countries (Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs [MoFA], 2013), but due to the domestic economic downturn from the
beginning of the 1990s, ﬁnancial aid has been on a downward trend since 1995
(OECD, 2013b; Figure 1).2 Japan has a strong preference for bilateral aid,
accounting for 81% of its aid in 2012. Japanese aid consists of loans (52% of
Japan’s gross bilateral ODA in 2012), technical cooperation (19%), and grants
(10%; MoFA, 2012a). In the same year, Japanese ODA as percent of GNI was
0.17% (OECD, 2013b). Japanese aid can be characterized in many ways:
Japanese aid has always demanded fewer conditionalities, its ﬁnancial terms
have been harder, and it has focused much more on the hardware side of aid,
such as building infrastructure, rather than software, such as governance and
institutional change. In addition, Japan has been more supportive of a leading
role for the state in development (Lancaster, 2010).
Although aid to other regions such as Africa has increased in recent years,
Japan has traditionally focused its aid on Asia, particularly East Asia (OECD,
2010). This is related to the fact that Japanese aid started in 1954 primarily as
reparations to 13 Asian countries after World War II (Sato, 2013). When the
DAC was established at the OECD in 1960, Japan joined the DAC before
joining the OECD. In 1961, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (later
becoming the Japan Bank of International Cooperation [JBIC]) was established
to take care of development aid ﬁnance due to pressures from the business sector
and politicians (JBIC, 2003). In 1962, the Overseas Technical Cooperation
Agency (later becoming the Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA]),
which handled technical assistance, was established (MoFA, 2002). Japan later
joined the OECD in 1965 but remained a relatively small donor until much later
(Sato, 2013).
From the mid-1970s, mainly due to external pressures, the amount of
Japanese aid began to increase dramatically (Potter, 2012). From 1975, several
events aﬀecting Japan’s resource security also convinced Japan to use aid for
diplomatic purposes (Sato, 2013). Meanwhile, the Japanese government
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announced that it would untie aid in 1978, which was considered by other
Western governments as a major step to align Japanese aid with DAC standards
(Lancaster, 2010). Japan made an oﬃcial announcement to make aid more con-
sistent with DAC norms in 1981, and the eﬀort to untie its aid continued during
the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Japan enjoyed its position as the
ﬁrst or second largest aid donor among DAC donor countries (MoFA, 2013).
Economic stagnation gradually changed Japan’s aid from 1991. After its peak
in 1995, ﬁnancial aid has been on a downward trend (OECD, 2013b). On the
other hand, related to a relative decline in power of the government and business
due to economic problems, Japanese NGOs started to exert more inﬂuence over
development aid policy during the 1990s (Sunaga, 2004). Also starting in the
1990s, the institutional aspect of Japanese aid became much more coordinated
Figure 1. ODA trend 1980–2012.
Source. OECD (2013b).
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and organized. The ﬁrst ODA charter was enacted in 1992, which stated four
philosophical underpinnings: (a) the imperative of humanitarian considerations,
(b) recognition of the interdependent relationships among member nations of
the international community, (c) the necessity for conserving the environment,
and (d) the necessity for supporting the self-help eﬀorts of developing countries
(MoFA, 1997).
In 1999, the Japanese government announced for the ﬁrst time that it
intended to improve the quality of overseas assistance rather than its quantity,
which was a dramatic change of direction in the country’s aid policy (MoFA,
2003). In 2003, the ODA Charter was revised and the government declared that
it would adopt the concept of human security.3 In its charter, Japan stated that
the basic policies of its ODA are (a) supporting self-help eﬀorts of developing
countries, (b) perspective of human security, (c) assurance of fairness, (d) util-
ization of Japan’s experience and expertise, and (e) partnership and collabor-
ation with the international community (MoFA, 2003). These new priorities
reﬂected the ongoing discussions on development aid at the time; Japanese
tax-payers believed that ODA should be beneﬁcial not only for recipient coun-
tries but also for Japan in the midst of a prolonged recession and demanded
much more visible eﬀects of their aid abroad.
In 2008, JBIC and JICA merged and became a new JICA, changing the role
and resources of related ministries and JICA itself. Nonetheless, the Japanese
development aid system still involves more than 13 ministries and agencies,
though the system is coordinated around a central hub: the International
Cooperation Bureau of the MoFA. MoFA is given the central coordinating
role by the ODA Charter, and around two thirds of Japanese ODA is managed
through MoFA and the new JICA. JICA is an independent administrative
agency and is held accountable by MoFA through a multiyear performance
plan. JICA is responsible for technical cooperation, concessional loans, and
aid grants. In addition to MoFA, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible
for Japan’s contributions to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
regional development banks. JICA loans also have to be approved by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). MoFA, MoF, and METI
are responsible for around 92% of Japanese oﬃcial assistance (OECD, 2010).
Japanese Environmental Aid
Japan’s environmental aid has been increasing at a steady pace, reaching 8.6
billion USD in 2010 (MoFA, 2012a; Figure 2). Japan has given environmental
aid4 since the 1980s, but the government started to give greater emphasis to
environmental issues around the start of the 1990s, particularly after its partici-
pation in the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (Kagawa-Fox, 2012). Around this
period, solving environmental problems came to be highlighted by a wide
range of actors in Japan as one of the key ways in which Japan could contribute
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to the international society. In the 1990s and 2000s, environmental aid became a
central component of Japanese eﬀorts in the ﬁeld of human security (Hall, 2010).
It is believed that Japan bases its environmental aid on its experience of the
environmental problems that brought serious pollution diseases with Japan’s
rapid economic development in the 1950s to 1970s (Gomez, 2008). Combined
with Japan’s relative preference for giving aid to infrastructure projects,
Japanese environmental aid has also been concentrated around building facil-
ities for water and sewage, energy, and transportation, using Japan’s advanced
technology on environment conservation. In addition, Japan has advocated the
importance of building human capacity to cope with environmental problems; in
other words, capacity development for environmental management. This pref-
erence manifests itself as a support for training programs for government oﬃcers
Figure 2. Environmental aid (USD million).
Source. OECD (2012a).
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of recipient countries (Mori, 2009). As previously mentioned, the Japanese
development aid system involves more than 13 ministries and agencies, but
the system is coordinated around MoFA, and MoFA and JICA are the main
actors for the implementation of environmental aid while the Ministry of
Environment has a relatively small budget for international environmental
cooperation as well.
According to Hall (2010), the rise of environmental aid in overall Japanese
aid can be explained by the following three factors: (a) the meeting of a new set
of transnational norms and networks and a remarkable convergence of interests
at the domestic level; (b) substantial leeway for Japanese actors to frame the
nature of the contribution that Japan could make to the environment at the
global level, because those new norms that helped make these projects were very
vague; and (c) dominant frame that emerged drew on existing narratives of
Japan’s own earlier pollution crisis, and of the nature of the Japanese political
economy, to help shape the direction that environmental aid took.
Analysis: Japanese Environmental Aid
The Bureaucratic and Institutional Imperatives
First, according to Williams (2002), aid is autobiographical of a donor country
in terms of the bureaucratic and institutional imperatives facing aid agencies;
they are hard interests rather than soft interests that are usually stated in the
agencies’ aims (p. 159). Of such hard interests, at least three are described as
follows: (a) the necessity to obtain money, (b) the pressure to spend money, and
(c) the desire to avoid or be insulated from criticism. In the Japanese budgetary
system, a competition among ministries (bureaucrats) to secure budget alloca-
tion to their own ministry or department is ﬁerce (Kadono & Takizawa, 2008),
accelerated by its vertically fragmented and pluralistic decision-making system
in bureaucracy. Naturally the necessity to obtain money is high for aid-related
agencies, even at least to maintain the level of budget allocation at the status
quo. An increase in the aid budget is generally welcomed among related oﬃcials,
both in terms of their capacity to provide aid to recipient countries and to secure
their inﬂuence inside the ministry and beyond.5 Based on the Japanese
Constitution Article No. 86, which states that “the Cabinet shall prepare and
submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each ﬁscal
year,” the Japanese budgetary system runs on a singular-year basis. This, com-
bined with the ﬁerce budgetary competitions, adds a strong pressure to aid-
related agencies to spend the money they have obtained. JICA has been given
an exception for appropriate projects that run over multiple ﬁscal years since
2008. This is because it has widely criticized the single-year budget system in that
it often did not ﬁt the demand of development aid projects that require multiple
years of commitment.
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Japanese aid agencies are not an exception in that they want to avoid or
insulate themselves from criticism. In 1991, Japan became the biggest bilateral
aid donor; in the same year, however, an OCED report heavily criticized
Japanese aid for being tied to Japanese businesses (Jempa, 1991). In reaction
to this criticism, Japanese aid agencies proceeded to further untie Japanese aid.
This eventually aroused domestic criticism that aid did not circulate beneﬁts to
Japanese business or society; this criticism led to a consensus that Japanese aid
to developing countries should bring economic beneﬁts not only to the recipient
but also to Japanese taxpayers if it is to fulﬁll accountability.6 The Revised ODA
Charter (2003) reﬂects this criticism well; in its introduction it states that
In line with the spirit of the Japanese Constitution, Japan will vigorously address
these new challenges to fulﬁll its responsibilities commensurate with its national
strength and its standing in the international community. In this regard, it is
important to have public support for ODA. It is essential to eﬀectively implement
ODA, fully taking into account the domestic economic and ﬁscal situation as well
as the views of the Japanese people.
Against this background, the Government of Japan has revised the ODA Charter,
with the aim of enhancing the strategic value, ﬂexibility, transparency, and eﬃ-
ciency of ODA. The revision also has the aim of encouraging wide public partici-
pation and of deepening the understanding of Japan’s ODA policies both within
Japan and abroad.
The Internal Procedures and Processes
Japanese aid agencies have tended to adopt programming systems similar to
those that are used in other government agencies. For instance, Japanese aid
has experienced an upsurge in evaluation and audit requirements in the past
decade. In 2001, JICA released its ﬁrst Guide to Project Evaluation (JICA, 2004).
This coincided with the Japanese government’s enaction of the Government
Policy Evaluations Act (Act No. 86 of June 29, 2001). The act aimed to promote
the implementation of policy evaluation in the planning and development of
policy among the Japanese administrative bodies, but the inﬂuence of internal
procedures and processes on aid policy was also visible prior to this. The Basic
Environmental Law of Japan (1993), which merged the Environmental Pollution
Prevention Act (1967) and the Nature Conservation Act (1972), was enacted
when environmental aid started to increase around the start of 1990s. In 1994,
the framework for environmental cooperation was concluded between Japan
and China, the largest recipient of Japanese environmental aid since then.
Using internal procedures for aid projects can create frustration between the
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donor and recipient. Wajjwalku and Tasarika (2008) described such frustration
from the Japanese aid agency side and Thai oﬃcials, who were the recipients of
Japanese environmental aid. During the Reforestation and Extension Project in
the northeast of Thailand (the REX Project), the relations of both sides were not
smooth to begin with, and the culture gap and the language barrier added to the
problem. Budget management was another aspect that frustrated cooperation,
mainly because of the failure of the Thai government to meet its ﬁnancial obli-
gations requested by the Japanese aid agency.
The Stated Policies
The stated policies of aid agencies often reﬂect changing political concerns
among donor state and society. In the Japanese case, it is not just a reﬂection
but also an embodiment of the political concerns of the Japanese government
and society. As a developmental state, where an interventionist government
guides and supports socioeconomic development through industrial growth in
a capitalist environment (Johnson, 1982), development aid has been one of two
central tools of Japan’s economic diplomacy, the other one being trade and
investment. The Japanese government and private sector have made cooperative
eﬀorts to sell technologies where Japanese businesses have a strong competitive
advantage (Okano-Haijmans, 2012). The Japanese government considers it
almost as its mission to introduce Japanese environmental technology
to developing countries7 as part of environmental aid because of its own experi-
ence with environmental problems that brought serious pollution problems
in the wake of rapid economic development in the 1950s to 1970s (Gomez,
2008; Hall, 2010). The Ministry of Environment (2011) explains this logic as
follows:
During its period of high economic growth, Japan experienced heavy industrial
pollution and other environmental problems. Through all-out eﬀorts by the
national and local governments, business corporations, and citizens’ groups, pol-
lution has abated dramatically. In addition, the country has achieved economic
growth while improving eﬃciency in use of resources and energy. Today, Japan is
working on waste disposal and other pollution issues related to everyday living,
global warming and conservation of nature. Backed by experiences and technolo-
gies developed through its own development, Japan is cooperating with countries
around the world, particularly developing countries in protection of the
environment.
As previously mentioned, after Japanese aid agencies were criticized that aid
did not beneﬁt the Japanese tax payers at all, it became important to make
Japanese aid more visible to both Japanese tax payers and the citizens of
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recipient countries (D. Potter, 1994). The Japanese ODA Charter, ﬁrst enacted
in 1992 and modiﬁed in 2003, repeatedly emphasizes the beneﬁt it will bring to
Japan: “Such eﬀorts will in turn beneﬁt Japan itself in a number of ways,
including by promoting friendly relations and people-to-people exchanges with
other countries, and by strengthening Japan’s standing in the international
arena.” (MoFA, 2003)
The Practices and Particular Attitude That Underlie Them
Aid activity is often shaped by a set of attitudes toward people and societies of
developing countries. As previously mentioned, the Japanese ODA charter
describes the basic policies of Japanese aid: supporting self-help eﬀorts of
developing countries, a perspective of human security, assurance of fairness,
utilization of Japan’s experience and expertise, and partnership and collabor-
ation with the international community. Japan places central importance on
support for the self-help eﬀorts of developing countries. This belief in self-help
eﬀorts comes from the interpretation of Japan’s postwar development experi-
ence, where the country achieved rapid economic growth through a combination
of its own eﬀorts and development aid (Sawamura, 2004). Rix (1993) has argued
that the connection between Japanese development aid philosophy and Japan’s
historical and cultural characteristics goes further back to its experience in the
19th century:
Japan is quick to remind others of its own rapid modernisation process from the
Meiji period (1868–1912) onwards, based on deliberate adaptation and learning
from the West, strong internal leadership and control, conscious policies to pro-
mote education and national awareness, and imperial expansion to support domes-
tic economic growth. It was an economically successful formula, and as a result the
principle of self-reliance among recipients has been entrenched in Japan’s current
aid policies. (pp. 15, 16)
The strong economic growth achieved by East Asian countries, which have been
the main recipients of Japanese aid, strengthened Japan’s belief in self-help. On
the other hand, this notion of self-help is criticized for putting too much faith in
a country’s own ability to make eﬀorts for development and weakens the sense
of charity toward the less fortunate (Rix, 1993). In addition, many countries lack
the administrative capacity necessary to act on their own initiatives (in other
words, self-help), and this makes Japan’s development aid policy less successful
in some cases (Sawamura, 2004). In environmental aid, administrative capacity
is of particular importance, as environmental management is considered most
eﬀective if done at a local administrative level, based on the subsidiarity prin-
ciple (Tonami & Mori, 2007).
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The Broader Impulse Behind Aid
Lastly, aid is autobiographical in terms of where the broader impulse for a
donor country to engage in development comes from. The Japanese ODA
Charter declares the objectives of Japan’s ODA: “to contribute to the peace
and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure
Japan’s own security and prosperity.” Williams (2002) criticized foreign aid for
being an expression of the particular moral outlook of Western societies, and
Japan does not hesitate to clearly express that Japan’s development aid, includ-
ing environmental aid, is (or should be) related to promoting Japan’s interests,
such as security and trade and investment promotion. In doing so, Japan devel-
oped the philosophy of self-help eﬀorts based on its own development experi-
ence, which is believed to function in recipient countries. Japanese aid, for these
reasons, can be said to be an autobiographic interpretation of Japanese eco-
nomic development history.
Background on South Korean Aid
In 2011, South Korean ODA amounted to 1.3 billion USD (OECD, 2013b), the
17th among the DAC member countries (OECD, 2013b). The South Korean aid
budget has increased steadily from 1990 until today, with a slump following the
1997 ﬁnancial crisis (Korea International Cooperation Agency [KOICA], 2011a;
OECD, 2013b). Like Japan, South Korea has a strong preference for bilateral
aid, accounting for 70% in 2011, of which grants accounted for 57.5% while
loans accounted for the remaining 42.5% (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade
[MOFAT], 2012; OECD, 2013c). The ODA budget for 2011 makes South Korea
a lower middle donor among OECD-DAC member countries, but its ODA/GNI
ratio stands at 0.12% in 2011 (OECD, 2012b), which is signiﬁcantly lower than
the 0.31% DAC average (Smart, 2011). Historically, aid projects were character-
ized by many smaller projects with a wide geographical spread and covering a
broad range of sectors primarily to spread its diplomatic inﬂuence as broadly as
possible in its competition with North Korean aid diplomacy. Similar to
Japanese ODA, South Korean ODA has always had a strong focus on Asia.
This can be related to three major factors: (a) geographical proximity; (b) greater
perceived compatibility between the South Korean development experience and
social, economic, political, and cultural proximity; and (c) closer economic and
political ties to Asian developing countries. South Korea has recently begun to
restructure aid to focus on a fewer number of priority countries mainly in Asia
and Africa to accommodate OECD-DAC recommendations (KOICA, 2011b).
South Korean ODA goes back to the early 1960s when the government began
to invite trainees from other developing countries to Korea. By the 1980s as
South Korea’s economic power increased, its aid began to focus on economic
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development to strengthen economic ties and to share its own experience with
other developing countries (KOICA, 2011a). In 1987, the Economic
Development Cooperation Fund (ECDF) was established to provide conces-
sional loans under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). In 1991,
the KOICA was founded to administer grant aid under MOFAT. By 1995,
South Korea was removed from the World Bank lending list, and in 1996, the
country joined the OECD and became a net donor of ODA (Smart, 2011;
KOICA, 2012b). In 2007, the government began to prepare for entrance into
the OECD-DAC, joining the group in 2010 as the ﬁrst so-called Third World
country. In January 2010, the government passed the Framework Act on
International Development Cooperation (FAIDC), the ﬁrst comprehensive
and overarching legislation on ODA to address ODA ineﬃciencies and frag-
mentation (KOICA, 2011a).
South Korean Environmental Aid
This article limits its analysis to environmental aid since the founding of KOICA
in 1991, acknowledging that modest amounts of environmental aid was provided
before this date and that ECDF loans go further back to 1987. In addition, we
focus primarily on environmental aid from the South Korean government falling
under the jurisdiction of either the KOICA or the Korean Economic
Development Fund (ECDF).8 Historically, there has been no overarching man-
agement of the two programs, and as previously mentioned, the programs fall
under the jurisdiction of two diﬀerent ministries. The two institutions often
consult with each other but lack coordination (OECD-DAC, 2008). Today,
approximately 80% of South Korean ODA is administered by KOICA and
ECDF. The remaining 20% is managed independently by 30 ministries, central
government organizations, and local municipalities (ODA Watch, 2012).
From the inception of KOICA in 1991, environmental aid has increased from
a few hundred thousand USD per year to 135 million USD in 2010 (KOICA,
2011a, 2011b). Although there has been a continuing upward trend in aid allo-
cated to environmental issues during the years where English language informa-
tion is available, a major increase occurred around 2004 (a year for which data
were unavailable at the time of writing). Environmental grant aid stood at
780,000 USD in 2003 rising to more than 27 million USD in 2005 and more
than 130 million USD in 2010 or 29.9% of the total budget allocated to KOICA
(2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011b). The increase in grant aid for environmental
projects has been followed by increases in concessional loans as well, but it is
diﬃcult to assess exactly to what extent because concessional loans for environ-
mental projects are not reported separately in the annual reports from the
ECDF (2008, 2009, 2011). By reading through major loan ﬁnancing projects,
it can be assessed that an increasing number of loans are given to projects related
to renewable energy and climate change (ECDF, 2011).
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Early environmental aid was relatively scattered and small scale. Projects
were selected on the basis of South Korean comparative advantage of expertise
from its own development history and on the basis of regional environmental
concerns that directly aﬀected South Korea. Reforestation and forest manage-
ment activities in China and Mongolia have been long-term areas of activity
because of desertiﬁcation in northern China and Mongolia causing dust storms
over the Korean peninsula in the spring season, with signiﬁcant implications for
public health and agriculture in South Korea (KOICA, 2002, 2003). Research on
seed selection and plant nurseries for reforestation eﬀorts in Indonesian rain
forests has also received long-term attention (KOICA, 2006). South Koreans
built signiﬁcant expertise in reforestation in the decades following the Korean
War, where most forests were cleared either for ﬁrewood or through bombing
raids. Remaining aid covered a wide range of areas, but most funds were used
for training and education of government oﬃcials from developing countries,
and supporting the overseas volunteer corps. By the early 2000s, environmental
aid received increasing attention, and South Korean expertise in areas such as
waste management, water management, and industrial pollution prevention
became more signiﬁcant components in development activities overseas, how-
ever, with a continued emphasis on Asia (KOICA, 2011b). The increase in
environmental aid coincided with domestic ambitions to improve South
Korea’s global standing that would reﬂect South Korea’s economic wealth
under then-President Roh Moo-Hyun (Kalinowski & Cho, 2012). During his
presidency, environmental aid increased signiﬁcantly but remained relatively low
in terms of share of total aid allocation, reaching 15% of total aid in 2007, the
ﬁnal year of Roh Moo-Hyun’s term.
The biggest surge in environmental aid and loans can be traced to the gov-
ernment led by Lee Myung-Bak, who came to power in late 2007 promising to
revive economic growth, but his presidency was hit early and hard by the global
economic recession. In August 2008, President Lee announced his new Low
Carbon, Green Growth vision9 for South Korea’s economic future as a way to
get the economy back on track. The following year, the government introduced
the National Strategy for Green Growth, the ﬁrst 5-year national economic
development plan since 1996 (Korea Economic Institute, 2011). The Green
New Deal allocated 38.1 billion USD over 4 years to stimulate the domestic
economy by fostering new green growth engines such as renewable energy, green
building, and low-carbon vehicles (United Nations Environment Programme
[UNEP], 2010). At the same time, President Lee also attempted new strategies
for establishing South Korea as a truly global player with clout (Watson, 2011;
Kalinowski & Cho, 2012). The Global Korea marketing initiative was
announced on January 22, 2009, almost simultaneously with the Green
New Deal. The Low Carbon Green Growth paradigm became a deﬁning com-
ponent of Global Korea activities. One pillar in President Lee’s 10-point strategy
for establishing South Korea as a global brand was an increase of ODA
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(Watson, 2011). South Korea aims to increase its ODA budget to 0.25% of GNI
by 2015 and to increase Green ODA to 30% of the total aid budget by 2020
(KOICA, 2011b). The most signiﬁcant initiative under Green ODA so far is the
EACP proposed by the president at the 2008 G8 summit in Toyako, Japan.
South Korea committed 200 million dollars to EACP between 2008 and 2012
(KOICA, 2011b). The EACP is managed by KOICA and is the single most
signiﬁcant boost to the environmental ODA budgets (KOICA, 2011b).
South Korea’s Green Growth strategy also extends into environmental aid
through the establishment of the GGGI. The GGGI was established in June
2010 at the order of President Lee to share the green growth experience of South
Korea with developing countries and diﬀuse Green Growth as a new model for
economic development (Global Green Growth Institute, 2012). The president
and the South Korean diplomatic apparatus have been actively involved in
building partnerships with strong environmental credentials that can legitimize
GGGI as an inﬂuential international organization, most notably through
recruitment of countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Qatar, as well as not-
able academic climate change celebrities such as Jeﬀrey D. Sachs and Sir
Nicholas Stern.
Analysis: Korean Environmental Aid
The Bureaucratic and Institutional Imperatives
In the South Korean administration, aid budget allocation is spread among a
plethora of ministries, agencies, and local governments, creating ﬁerce interin-
stitutional competition each year. Despite oﬃcial commitment to improve over-
all coordination though the Committee of International Development
Cooperation in 2010, further fragmentation has occurred (ODA Watch, 2012).
South Korean government bureaucracies are hierarchically ordered, which
means certain ministries have much better leverage in accessing aid funds. For
example, ECDF is under the jurisdiction of the MoF, historically the most
powerful ministry, while KOICA is under MOFAT. Therefore, one way that
hard humanitarian interests guide South Korean ODA is through competition
over aid allocations in a hierarchical structure of favored or less favored minis-
tries, agencies, and local governments. Funding allocations indicate governmen-
tal hierarchy; therefore, funding completion is a competition for recognition,
inﬂuence, and maintenance of the interinstitutional government hierarchy.10
Sheltering the government from external criticism that may reduce South
Korea’s international standing is of concern, leading to some changes in
South Korean aid policy, especially since the entry into the DAC. South
Korea is keenly aware of its international position as a wealthy but politically
weak country. Its international standing depends much on building a reputation
as a balancing middle power. South Korea uses multiple strategies to
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accommodate and sometimes deﬂect criticism. For example, the government has
committed itself to untying 100% of its aid by 2015 (KOICA, 2011b). There is
visible progress; however, in 2010, 64% of aid remained tied, which is far from
the target the government has set. South Korea deﬂects criticism also by empha-
sizing its early stage of ODA experience, accommodating some structural
changes to aid policies, while stressing South Korea’s unique position as an
aid recipient turned donor. The latter argument is used to defend a particular
South Korean approach to development. Insulation from domestic criticism is
done in various ways. The government has actively promoted ODA to the public
through media campaigns to emphasize the importance of ODA for South
Korea’s international reputation and economic interest and to share the South
Korean miracle with the less fortunate countries of the world. The most signiﬁ-
cant domestic criticism comes from civil society groups such as ODA Watch,
which has been repeatedly denied access to detailed data on the ODA budget on
grounds of conﬁdentiality and other nondisclosure of information (ODAWatch,
2012).11 As such, the government is using various strategies to accommodate and
deﬂect criticism both domestically and abroad.
The Internal Procedures and Processes
KOICA, the main South Korean agency in charge of grant aid, set up internal
evaluation principles and guidelines in 1996 and later revised to align with
OECD-DAC recommendations (KOICA, 2011a). Projects are evaluated based
on ﬁve standards: appropriateness, eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, inﬂuence, and sus-
tainability. In 2006, KOICA expanded evaluation procedures to include policy,
strategy, sectors, and topics. The organization also adopted a rating system. The
evaluation guidelines were completely revised as part of the preparation of entry
into the OECD-DAC, and at the time of this writing, a uniﬁed evaluation pro-
cess was underway to further streamline evaluation and auditing of ODA.
However, critics have already pointed out the lack of a feedback loop on evalu-
ation results and question the quality and impartiality of the independent evalu-
ations (ODA Watch, 2012). Although KOICA and ECDF are taking steps to
improve external evaluation, many other ministries do not delegate evaluation to
external auditors, which makes it very diﬃcult to assess ODA procedures and
processes. It has not been possible to obtain information on evaluation and
auditing guidelines from other agencies and ministries with ODA activities.
All of these show that internal procedures and processes are not coherent due
to the fragmented nature of South Korean ODA across many ministries, agen-
cies, and local governments, although certain actions are in place to streamline
ECDF and KOICA procedures and processes (ODA Watch, 2012).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that aid agencies are adapting evaluation and
auditing procedures according to the requirements by the commanding minis-
tries and agencies under which they operate.
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The Stated Policies
The stated policies of South Korean environmental aid clearly reﬂect the chan-
ging political concerns of the government and society. In the past decades,
environmental aid has moved from small projects providing aid based on com-
parative advantage based on South Korean development experience and
domestic environmental concerns, such as yellow dust storms, to a more
forward-looking approach that also takes into account future export markets
and resource-rich locations. Being environmental is also deﬁned as central to
South Korea’s global diplomatic ambitions and domestic economic priorities.
The environment and climate change are major components of a Global Korea,
highlighting the strategy of combining economic interest and political ambitions
for international recognition as an environmental leader. Proposed at the G8
Summit in 2008, South Korea committed 200 million USD between 2008 and
2012 to the EACP (KOICA, 2012b). The stated goal of the EACP is to “suc-
cessfully realize ‘win-win’ strategy that pursues both to deal with climate change
and to continue economic development by researching a new sustainable eco-
nomic paradigm and by creating ‘East Asia Low Carbon Development path’”
(KOICA, 2012a). The EACP has helped South Korea’s Low Carbon Green
Growth development model to establish a regional leadership position through
environmental aid activities while disseminating Korean technology and exper-
tise. The GGGI founded in 2009 by the president has become the spearhead
initiative in advancing South Korea’s national development strategy to the front
stage of global environmental governance. Recently GGGI was recognized as
an international organization, thus achieving global acknowledgement not only
for the institution itself but also for South Korea’s Green Growth development
model.
The Practices and Particular Attitude That Underlie Them
Much the same as Japanese ODA, a high proportion of the South Korean ODA
budget is concessional loans (e.g., 52% of Japan’s gross bilateral ODA in 2012
and 42.5% of Korea’s ODA in 2011), and this is explained and defended as a
result of South Korea’s own experience with high levels of foreign borrowing
during its own development in the 1960s to 1980s (Watson, 2011; E. Kim & Oh,
2012; Kalinowski & Cho, 2012). It is argued that loans provide greater ﬁscal
responsibility and motivate loan recipients to take ownership of their own devel-
opment (S. Kim, 2011). Another aspect of South Korean ODA is that it tends to
have a strong bias in favor of lower middle income countries (LMICs) rather
than least developed countries (LDCs). This is a phenomenon that can be
explained by stronger economic ties to LMICs (E. Kim & Oh, 2012) and a
notion that South Korea’s experience is more compatible with a certain stage
of economic development (Smart, 2011). The signiﬁcant emphasis that
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South Korea puts on highlighting its own former status as a poor Third World
country seeks to set the country apart from other OECD-DAC donors by high-
lighting the emotional and historical ties to the developing world. Yet the notion
of being a particular development success also seeks to establish South Korea’s
development model as an empirical and universal model for other countries to
follow. It establishes South Korea as the ultimate expert on development deriv-
ing from experience, supported by evidence that it worked in South Korea and
other countries can replicate this success by following the recommendations of
South Korea. In the environmental area, this has been expressed in the strong
focus on speciﬁc areas where South Korea has expertise, such as reforestation,
water management, and pollution management. However, the Green Growth
paradigm, which was the center of South Korean domestic economic policy
during the President Lee administration, became the central guiding light of
environmental aid, and green aid is planned to make up 30% of total aid by
2020 (KOICA, 2011a). Noteworthy is that areas such as climate adaption, miti-
gation, and renewable energy are relatively new areas to South Korea, while
earlier environmental projects were implemented in areas where South Korea
did have long-term experience. At the time of writing, signiﬁcant improvements
of South Korean technology in these areas remain to be seen. The universal
applicability of the South Korean development experience, with modiﬁcations, is
a clear example of how environmental aid is guided by domestic economic and
political concerns.
The Broader Impulse Behind Aid
South Korea’s own experience as an aid-receiving Third World country is a
major constitutive element in successive formulations of South Korean aid
policy. First, there is a sense of pride of moving from aid recipient to a major
aid donor, marking the success of the postwar development project (Watson,
2011). Second, aid has a moral component that emphasizes giving back to the
global community that supported South Korean development and to transfer
the development experience and model(s) (ECDF, 2008; S. Kim, 2011; KOICA,
2011a). Third, the country’s rapid economic ascent from a third-world country is
used to position South Korea apart from the rest of the DAC members, placing
South Korea as a bridge builder between donor countries and recipient countries
(KOICA, 2011a). Fourth, aid plays a signiﬁcant role in strengthening economic
ties to countries of relevance because of trade or resource interests. Finally,
ODA policy formulation also increasingly mirrors a political wish to increase
the status, recognition, and position of South Korea as a signiﬁcant player in
global politics. This element became particularly prevalent under the Roh Moo-
Hun administration and has been further strengthened under Lee Myung-Bak,
which is also reﬂected in the relatively higher increase of ODA budgets since
the mid-2000s (Watson, 2011; E. Kim & Oh, 2012; Kalinowski & Cho, 2012).
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These impulses may interact, conﬂict with, and complement each other in vari-
ous ways. In the case of environmental aid, the heavy focus on disseminating the
Green Growth paradigm combines the impulses in particular ways. The ability
to establish Green Growth as an internationally recognized development para-
digm has opened new opportunities both politically and economically. It has
enhanced the status of the country in the eyes of the international community.
This recognition in turn enables environmental aid to become a central aspect of
strengthening economic and political ties to resource-rich developing countries.
In the process, South Korea’s own understanding of itself has also changed from
that of a country catching up with the rich developed world to a country taking
the lead on global governance issues. It appears that speciﬁcally within environ-
mental aid, South Korea has found a domain in which all impulses become
mutually constitutive.
Discussion
In this article, we attempted to analyze and compare Japanese and South
Korean environmental aid using Williams’s (2002) aid as autobiography
approach. Our aim was to illuminate the contingent character of environmental
aid of Japan and South Korea as the outcome of particular interpretations of
their own development history and position in global politics. A comparison of
Japanese and South Korean environmental aid was particularly useful to high-
light the characteristics of South Korea, an emerging actor in the environmental
aid sector, as well as in global environmental governance. Based on our analysis,
we have found the following.
First, both Japanese and South Korean aid systems are under strong pressure
to obtain and spend money, which is based on bureaucratic and institutional
imperatives such as interagency competition over fund allocations and the pro-
cedures of ﬁscal allocations. Given South Korea’s more fragmented structure,
interagency competition appears to be ﬁercer, leading to competing programs
and projects under various ministries and agencies. Both countries are sensitive
to external criticism, particularly from the OECD-DAC, but they seek to deﬂect
criticism by emphasizing their particular expertise and development experiences.
The Japanese have a relatively longer history of giving aid and therefore a longer
history of the involvement of the public. As a result, Japanese aid, including
environmental aid, seems to reﬂect more the opinions of domestic business and
the public. In the case of South Korea, environmental aid has primarily been
guided by the vision of the president while the public and NGO sector have less
inﬂuence on aid policy formulation.
Second, the internal procedures and processes are well reﬂected in Japanese
and South Korean aid’s auditing and evaluation procedures. Japan’s auditing
and evaluation procedures have led to confusion and frustration among recipi-
ents. In the case of South Korea, KOICA has implemented a set of evaluation
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guidelines, but because aid is so fragmented between various ministries and
agencies, an overarching evaluation and audit system still does not exist. The
fragmentation means that diﬀerent aid projects and programs may have diﬀer-
ent reporting requirements, which has also led to increased administrative
burden on recipients, as they have to deal with multiple reporting requirements
(ODA Watch, 2012).
Third, the stated policies of Japan and South Korea demonstrate the shifting
political and economic concerns of the two countries. Both countries consider
development aid as an important tool of their diplomacy, and in environmental
aid, promoting their domestic environmental technologies and expertise abroad
is considered an important mission, backed by their stories of domestic devel-
opment success. Although the manner in which numerous actors are involved in
aid policy formulation is similar in both countries, it is observed that much
stronger power revolves around the president in South Korea. For instance,
the Low Carbon, Green Growth concept was at ﬁrst part of the campaign
introduced by President Lee Myung-Bak to promote economic growth after
the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis. This concept was later well integrated into the
National Strategy for Green Growth, Green New Deal, or the Global Korea
Campaign, with his strong leadership and a top-down decision-making mech-
anism. This suggests that aid policy is very much determined by the type of
vision the president has for the future of South Korea. As a result, changing
international or domestic political concerns are much more vividly expressed in
the case of South Korea. In fact, the government of South Korea changed after
the presidential election in December 2012, and the new government oﬃcially
announced the new vision of growth. The new vision “A New Era of Hope” by
the newly elected president Park Geun-hye calls for a new direction of environ-
mental policies, titled “Environmental Welfare State” (Ministry of Environment,
2013).
Lastly, the broader impulses behind the aid of Japan and South Korea are a
combination of a moral obligation and domestic, international, political, and
economic interests. What distinguishes them from other Western donors is that
Japan and South Korea are using their past as developing countries or industrial
latecomers as a principal reason for their particular approaches that may receive
criticism from the Western donors. Japan considers itself as having a role to lead
other developing countries because it can understand what it means to make
self-help eﬀorts, whereas South Korea positions itself as a bridge between
so-called developed nations and developing countries both politically and emo-
tionally. The rags-to-riches narrative is embedded in Japan’s self-help eﬀorts
philosophy and in South Korea’s “Korea model”. This belief in the applicability
of particular interpretations of their own development experience is what under-
lies their aid practices and attitudes toward developing countries. Both Japan
and South Korea clearly indicate not only that aid is based on altruism, but also
that it is about mutual beneﬁts, global recognition, and economic interests.
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This does not necessarily make it less altruistic than Western donors but rather
that the altruistic motive is not considered the only acceptablemotivation for aid.
In this regard, Japan and South Korea appear to rhetorically distance themselves
from the so-called Western donors. Japan and South Korea tried to promote
experience-based development models, yet these also tend to become universal
claims about development. For both Japan and South Korea, environmental aid
became the opportunity to play a signiﬁcant role in the global aid community; for
Japan, this occurred in the 1990s, and for South Korea, in the 2010s.
Conclusion
In this article we analyzed and compared Japanese and South Korean environ-
mental aid to highlight the inﬂuence that both countries brought to the political
dynamics of environmental aid, rather than to evaluate them. We sought to
bring forth the way in which environmental aid has been shaped by Japan
and South Korea’s understanding of themselves in global politics, their devel-
opment history, and domestic political and economic concerns. Using the frame-
work of Williams (2002), which contends aid policy is rather a reﬂection of a
donor country’s self-image and that this can be seen through analysis of ﬁve
speciﬁc areas, we examined various policies, government documents, and the
information obtained through interviews. We highlighted ﬁve areas of Japanese
and South Korean environmental aid: the bureaucratic and institutional impera-
tives, the internal procedures and processes, the stated policies, the practices and
particular attitudes that underlie them, and the broader impulses behind aid.
This article showed that both Japan and South Korea are promoting experience-
based development models in environmental aid, and this gives them an oppor-
tunity to play a signiﬁcant role in the global aid community. Furthermore, it
shows how interinstitutional dynamics and internal bureaucratic processes shape
aid policy formulation, and in the case of South Korea, how the president’s
vision for a global South Korea understood both in economic and political
terms has aﬀected environmental aid policy formulation. There are remaining
aspects to be analyzed in the future. By using Williams’s theory, we were able to
outline trajectories of environmental aid policies in Japan and South Korea as
historically contingent. Environmental aid policies reﬂected their understandings
of their own development trajectories and position in the global order.
Meanwhile, this study did not address a deeper analysis of their narratives, in
other words, how these narratives were implemented as actual environmental aid
projects or programs and how they further enforced or weaken their belief in the
prescribed narrative. Tasks to study how Japanese and South Korean environ-
mental aid was received in developing countries remain. Furthermore, in this
article, we have limited our analysis to Japan and South Korea’s bilateral envir-
onmental aid because of the importance that both governments place on bilat-
eral aid. In the meantime, there are signs that both Japan and South Korea
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recognize the signiﬁcance of multilateral environmental aid. For example, a
former oﬃcial from the MoF of Japan became the new chief executive oﬃcer
of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 2012 (MoFA, 2012b), and the
secretariat of the new Green Climate Fund will be established in South Korea
(Yonhap, 2012). With new ﬁnancial mechanisms becoming more prominent in
aiding developing countries with environmental issues and climate change issues,
we look forward to giving attention to this aspect of Japanese and South Korean
environmental aid in the future.
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Notes
1. More specifically, OECD-DAC defines ODA as “those flows to countries and terri-
tories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are:
i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their
executive agencies; and ii) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the pro-
motion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main
objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25
per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)” (OECD-DAC, 2013a).
2. Except for a few hikes in 2000 and 2005. Meanwhile, Japan has made use of its annual
supplementary budget to achieve temporary increased in its development aid budget
(OECD, 2010). Although this approach is criticized that it makes aid flows unpredict-
able and complicates planning, it should be noted that the actual aid volume has not
shrunk dramatically.
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3. The Japanese government started to pay attention to the concept human security
from the late 1990s, largely due to an influential Japanese diplomat, Sadako Ogata,
who was then the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Fukushima,
2007). In 1998, the late prime minister Obuchi announced that a Trust Fund for
Human Security would be established in the United Nations. The government of
Japan then founded the Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999, with an initial
contribution of about 5,000 million JPY. By 2009, total contributions amounted to
some 39 billion JPY, making the Trust Fund, one of the largest of its kind established
in the United Nations (MoFA, 2009).
4. The Japanese government defines environmental aid following the definition of
DAC_CRS statistics (MoFA, 2012a). OECD-DAC (2013b) defines environmental
aid as “aid targeting environmental sustainability,” which includes activities that
specifically aim at improving the environment (e.g., biodiversity conservation, bio-
sphere protection, environmental policy, and planning), and others that are environ-
ment-oriented activities, such as infrastructure projects designed with integrated
environmental protection components, water resources protection, or sustainable
forest management programs. The authors acknowledge the work of Hicks et al.
(2008), which redefined and reconsidered the content of effective environmental
aid; however, in this article, we will conduct our analysis based on both governments’
definitions of environmental aid as the authors are interested in their own narratives
about aid.
5. Interview with a government official, February 2012.
6. Interview with a researcher at the JICA Research Institute, February 2012.
7. Interview with a ministry official, February 2012.
8. KOICA administers approximately 80% of total grant aid while ECDF, operated by
the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM), provides concessional loans to develop-
ing countries. Approximately 20% of grant aid is administered by other ministries
and agencies and thus is not under the control of KOICA.
9. The national Green Growth strategy has received widespread international recogni-
tion, but domestic criticism has been fierce. Controversial elements of the plan such
as the CO2 emissions targets, the expansion of nuclear power, overseas resource
diplomacy, and the controversial Four River Restoration projects are central elem-
ents of the strategy and also the elements under heavy criticism for their limited or
potentially damaging impact (Green Korea United, 2010a, 2010b; Yun, 2010; Yun,
Cho, & Hippel, 2011).
10. Interview with KOICA official, September 17, 2012.
11. This lack of access to information is not an issue particular to ODA. Civil society
groups and the government tend to have adversarial relationships and the govern-
ment often limits access on the grounds of national security and confidentiality,
which also shelters the government and agencies from civil society scrutiny and
criticism.
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